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Abstract
The current research explored the neural mechanisms linking social status to perceptions of the
social world. Two fMRI studies provide converging evidence that individuals lower in social
status are more likely to engage neural circuitry often involved in ‘mentalizing’ or thinking about
others' thoughts and feelings. Study 1 found that college students' perception of their social status
in the university community was related to neural activity in the mentalizing network (e.g.,
DMPFC, MPFC, precuneus/PCC) while encoding social information, with lower social status
predicting greater neural activity in this network. Study 2 demonstrated that socioeconomic status,
an objective indicator of global standing, predicted adolescents' neural activity during the
processing of threatening faces, with individuals lower in social status displaying greater activity
in the DMPFC, previously associated with mentalizing, and the amygdala, previously associated
with emotion/salience processing. These studies demonstrate that social status is fundamentally
and neurocognitively linked to how people process and navigate their social worlds.
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Social hierarchies are a ubiquitous feature of social groups, from adolescent cliques to the
stratification of wealth across societies. Decades of research now suggest that social status,
or an individual's place in a social hierarchy, is predictive of a variety of important
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outcomes, such as physical and mental health (Adler et al., 1994; Gianaros and Manuck,
2010) as well as neurocognitive functioning (e.g., working memory, language processing;
Noble et al., 2007). Where one stands in a social hierarchy is a critical determinant of their
psychological and biological outcomes.
Social status also seems to affect how people navigate their social worlds. A growing body
of research has begun to document status-based differences in social behavior. For example,
during interpersonal interactions, individuals who are relatively lower in social status exhibit
cues that they are closely attending to an interaction partner (more eye contact, head
nodding, laughing; Kraus and Keltner, 2009). By contrast, higher-status individuals' are
more likely to behave in ways suggesting less engagement in the interaction (relatively more
self-grooming, fidgeting, doodling). Furthermore, relative to higher-status individuals, low-
status individuals are more likely to give to others during economic bargaining games, and
they donate a greater percentage of their income to charity (Piff et al., 2010; Rucker et al.,
2011). Together, these data converge on the idea that social status moderates the extent to
which individuals are focused on others.
A related line of research suggests that social status not only guides social behavior, it also
influences social cognitive processes. In particular, social status affects performance on
tasks that involve thinking about the thoughts and feelings of others. For example,
individuals who are lower-status are more accurate at inferring the emotional states of
others, relative to their higher-status counterparts (Kraus et al., 2010). When people are
experimentally manipulated to feel low status, they are more accurate at reading the
emotions of others, compared to when they are made to feel high status (Kraus et al., 2010).
Finally, participants who are asked to recall a time in which they had low power (a
characteristic similar to status) are more likely to adopt the perspective of another person
than individuals who recall a time in which they had high power (Galinsky et al., 2006).
Together with the literature on social status-based differences in social behavior, these data
provide support for the hypothesis that lower-status individuals are more likely to engage in
social cognitive processes that aid in understanding how others think, feel, and behave.
Although past research suggests that social status affects the tendency to try and understand
how others think and feel, much of this research has explicitly asked participants to take the
perspective of another (e.g., “identify the emotion the person in this photo is feeling”; cf.
Galinsky et al., 2006). Thus, it remains relatively unclear whether individuals who are lower
in social status spontaneously think about the thoughts and feelings of others when they
encounter social situations, or if they are simply better at inferring others' beliefs and
emotions when directed to do so. Neuroimaging methods offer an opportunity to examine
the extent to which people may be engaging social cognitive processes even when they are
not explicitly asked to perform such tasks. Although some neuroimaging studies have
examined how people process cues of social status in others (Chiao, 2010; Chiao et al.,
2009; Marsh et al., 2009), and the role of social status in the context of performance-based
feedback (Zink et al., 2008), no known studies have examined the relationship between an
individual's own social status and their neural activity during tasks that involve
understanding others.
As it turns out, the neural processes that are engaged when thinking about the thoughts and
feelings of others are well documented. Specifically, a network of brain regions, including
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus/
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS) is consistently activated during tasks that require understanding the
mental states of others, or mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2010; Mitchell,
2009).
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To examine if social status modulates neural activity in the mentalizing network, we
conducted two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. In Study 1, we
examined how a subjective measure of social status related to neural activity when encoding
information about another individual. Given that subjective perceptions of social status have
been shown to predict certain health outcomes even better than more objective measures of
status (i.e., socioeconomic status [SES]; Singh-Manoux et al., 2005), we focused on
subjective social status in this study. We employed a task that involved encoding
information about another individual, given that this type of task has been shown in prior
work to reliably engage the mentalizing network (for a review, see Mitchell, 2009). We
predicted that individuals lower in social status would show greater activity in brain regions
typically engaged during mentalizing, compared to high status individuals. In a second
study, we used a new subject population – adolescents – and examined whether a more
objective measure of social status, SES, would modulate neural activity during a threat-
processing task. Responses to a threat-processing task may be particularly illuminating of
status-based differences in mentalizing, as interpretations of whether another's intentions are
threatening – which requires mentalizing – has been shown to be moderated by SES (Chen
et al., 2004). We predicted that adolescents from lower SES households would show greater
neural activity in brain regions involved in mentalizing during this task compared to high
SES adolescents. Across the two studies, we predicted that regardless of subject population
and whether the stimuli were threatening or non-threatening, those lower in social status
would show greater neural activity in mentalizing-related neural regions.
Study 1
Method
Participants—Participants were 16 undergraduate students (8 males) who were between
the ages of 18 and 24 (M age = 19.81 years, SD = 1.8). All participants were Caucasian,
right-handed, and reported no history of neurological disorder.
Procedure—Participants underwent an fMRI scan while they viewed pictures and read
social and non-social passages describing people and objects. Following the scan,
participants completed a measure of subjective social status.
Measures
Social status measure: To measure social status, participants completed a modified version
of the MacArthur Subjective Social Status Scale (Adler et al., 2000). Participants were
shown a picture of a ladder with ten rungs: at the top of the ladder are the people who are the
best off (most money, most education, best jobs); at the bottom of the ladder are the people
who are the worst off (least money, least education, worst jobs). They were asked to indicate
on which rung they thought they were, in reference to the rest of the UCLA community,
given that this was likely to be the group in which status was most salient for a college-
student sample. Scores ranged from 2 to 8 (out of a possible 10; M = 6.16, SD = 1.91),
indicating that participants varied in their perceptions of their social status within the UCLA
community.
Neuroimaging task: Participants were scanned using BOLD fMRI while they were
presented with a series of images (described below), each accompanied by a descriptive text
passage (see Supplementary Fig. 1; designed by S. Morelli). First, participants viewed a
fixation crosshair for 4 s. Then, they completed a self-paced task. Participants were asked to
look at a photo, read a passage, and press a button to advance to the next screen when they
were finished reading, which yielded a measure of reaction time. Participants completed a
total of four trials, alternating between two social-information trials, and two object-
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information trials (presented in counterbalanced order). After making a button press to
indicate they had finished reading the passage, the passage disappeared, and a fixation
crosshair was presented for 15 s.
During the “social information” trials of the task, participants viewed an image of a UCLA
student that matched the participant's gender and ethnicity, and read two passages the person
supposedly wrote. The passages were written from a first-person perspective, using the
pronoun “I”. Importantly, participants were not explicitly instructed to take the perspective
of the person in the photo. One passage described the pictured individual's thoughts and
feelings at the beginning of a new quarter of school; the other described his/her thoughts and
feelings about going to lunch with a friend.
During the “object information” trials of the task, participants viewed an image of an
inanimate object (e.g., pedometer, flash drive) and read a passage describing the object in an
objective, unemotional way. These trials were designed as a comparison task for the social
task: They did not involve any social information, but still required participants to view an
image and read a description of that image.
fMRI data acquisition—Images were collected using a Siemens Trio 3-T MRI scanner.
Participants were instructed to hold as still as possible during the scan; foam padding around
the head was provided to restrict motion. A high-resolution structural scan coplanar with the
functional scans was obtained for functional image registration during pre-processing (echo
planar fast T2-weighted segmented spin echo, TR = 5000 ms, TE = 34 ms, FOV = 220 mm,
33 slices, 4.0 mm slice thickness). Task stimuli were presented on a computer screen
through MR-compatible goggles. Both the social-information and object-information tasks
were presented during a functional scan lasting approximately 5 min (parameters for
functional scan: echo-planar T2*weighted gradient-echo, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip
angle = 75, 33 slices, FOV = 220 mm, 4.0 mm slice thickness).
fMRI data analysis—Data analysis was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, London). Images were realigned, coregistered, normalized into
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, resliced into voxels of 3 mm cubed and
smoothed with an 8 mm Gaussian kernel. First-level effects were estimated using the
general linear model and employed a canonical hemodynamic response function convolved
with the experimental design. Low-frequency noise was removed using a high-pass filter
(128 s). The task was modeled at the first (subject) level as a block design with two
conditions (object information, social information). Linear contrasts between the two
conditions were computed for each participant. Random effect analyses of the group were
computed using the contrast images generated for each participant.
We first examined the main effect of social information processing by comparing neural
activity during the social-information trials with activity during the object-information trials
in a whole-brain analysis. Then, to examine how social status related to neural activity in
mentalizing regions during social (vs. object) information processing, participants' ratings of
their social status were entered as a regressor in the contrast of social information >object
information. Given our strong a-priori hypothesis regarding the relation of social status to
neural activity in mentalizing brain regions, we restricted our analysis to only search for
significantly active clusters within anatomically defined regions-of-interest (ROIs) based on
the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas for regions known to be involved in mentalizing.
These included DMPFC (−20<x<20, 30<y<66, 26<z<64), MPFC (−20<x<20, 46<y<76,
−10<z<26), bilateral TPJ (for left: −70<x<−38, −64<y<−40, 22<z<38; for right: 38<x<70,
−64<y<−40, 22<z<38), bilateral pSTS (for left: −70<x<−46, −58<y<−30, −4<z<16; for
right: 46<x<70,−58<y<−30,−4<z<16), and precuneus/PCC (−20<x<20, −82<y<−30,
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10<z<84). All ROIs were combined to create one ‘mentalizing mask’. Statistical
significance was based on both a peak threshold and a spatial extent threshold that corrects
for multiple comparisons to a level of p < .05. Spatial extent threshold was determined by
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations conducted using the AlphaSim program in AFNI. The
criteria input to AlphaSim included uncorrected p-value (.005), voxel size (3 × 3 × 3),
spatial smoothing kernel (8 mm), and the number of voxels in the mask (5276). Based on
these parameters, a cluster extent of 21 voxels was necessary in order to achieve a corrected
threshold of p < .05. All coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
format.
Results and discussion
To confirm that the social information trials were associated with greater activity in
mentalizing regions, we examined neural activity for the social compared to the object trials.
Results indicated that, during social vs. object information trials, participants displayed
heightened activity in regions known to comprise the mentalizing neural network, including
DMPFC, MPFC, precuneus/PCC, and left pSTS (see Supplementary Table 1 for complete
information).
Next, to examine how social status related to neural activity during the social compared to
object trials, we examined correlations between social status and activity in mentalizing
ROIs. Consistent with hypotheses, results revealed a negative correlation between social
status and neural activity in clusters within DMPFC, MPFC, and precuneus/PCC (see Table
1/Fig. 1), such that lower status was associated with greater activity in these regions. There
were no significantly active clusters in TPJ or pSTS. When we expanded our search space to
include all voxels of the brain (not just the mentalizing ROI mask), there were no additional
neural regions that showed a negative correlation with social status. Status did not correlate
positively with neural activity in any region.1
To rule out the possibility that any status-based differences in neural activity were due to
differences in the amount of time spent processing the passages, we subtracted reaction
times to reading the object information from reaction times to reading the social
information, and correlated these difference scores with our measure of social status. There
was no correlation between reaction time differences and social status (r = −.05, ns),
suggesting that the patterns of neural activity observed as a function of status were not
simply due to the amount of time spent processing the stimuli.
Results from Study 1 indicate a reliable, negative association between perceptions of social
status and neural activity in regions of the mentalizing network during the encoding of social
information. These results suggest that when presented with social information, low-status
individuals may spontaneously focus more on the mental states of others.
Study 2
Study 1 focused on university students' subjective perceptions of their social status. In Study
2, we wanted to examine whether a more objective indicator of social status, SES, related to
neural activity in the mentalizing network. We also wanted to extend these findings to a
sample of adolescents. Given that SES in childhood and adolescence is a better predictor of
health outcomes than adult SES (Kittleson et al., 2006), understanding the neurocognitive
correlates of social information processing in children and adolescents is of paramount
1There was no effect of gender on neural activity in the contrast of social information >object information, nor did gender moderate
the correlation between social status and neural activity in mentalizing regions (all p's > .3). There were also no gender differences in
reaction times to reading the passages (p > .2).
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importance. However, it remains unclear if lower-status adolescents are more likely to
engage neural circuitry involved in thinking about others during social processing tasks.
In addition, because threat responses are hypothesized to be one mechanism by which social
status influences health, we designed Study 2 to look at neural responses to social threat.
Previous research suggests that adolescents who are lower in SES are more likely to
interpret social situations as threatening (Chen et al., 2004), and to respond to threatening
social cues with more neural activity in the amygdala, a brain structure engaged during the
processing of emotion and salience (Gianaros et al., 2007). As a result, Study 2 focused on
neural responses to socially threatening images. Based on results from Study 1, we
hypothesized that lower SES would be associated with greater mentalizing-related neural
activity during the viewing of threatening facial expressions.
Method
Participants—Participants were 22 adolescents (14 females) between the ages of 12 and
13 at the time of the fMRI scan (M = 13.02 years, SD = .29), and were taking part in a large,
longitudinal study of neural development during adolescence (e.g., Pfeifer et al., 2011).
Procedure—Participants were invited, with their parents, to UCLA, where they underwent
an fMRI scan while viewing pictures of threatening facial expressions (see below for more
detail on the MRI task). The participant's parent who brought him/her to the scan was asked
to report their SES (see below).
Measures
Social status measure: The parent of each participant was asked to indicate which of 22
categories best represented their household income (range: “under $15,000/year” to “greater
than $400,000/year”). Parents also reported on the highest level of education the child's
mother completed (e.g., B.A./B.S. degree). These two measures were z-scored and combined
to form a composite index of SES (Kraus et al., 2009). Overall, adolescents in the present
sample had parents who were well educated (median education level = college degree), and
lived in households that were relatively high income (median = $ 100,000–120,000/year).
However, there was substantial variability across the sample (range for maternal education =
high school diploma–graduate degree; range for household income = $15,000/year to >
$320,000/year).
Neuroimaging task: Participants were scanned using BOLD fMRI while they viewed
threatening emotional expressions, specifically expressions of anger. Images were taken
from the NimStim database of emotional faces (Tottenham et al., 2009). Participants were
simply instructed to passively view the facial expression for 2 s. We were particularly
interested in the neural response to expressions of anger, as previous research has
demonstrated that anger is an emotion expression relevant to social status, particularly for
those with low status (Allan and Gilbert, 2002; Wilkinson, 1999).
As a baseline, participants also viewed a fixation crosshair in the center of the screen for a
variable interval between the emotional expressions (ranging from 0.5–1.5 s; see
Supplementary Fig. 2). Participants viewed 16 angry-face trials and 16 fixation-trials.
fMRI data acquisition—Data were acquired using a Siemens Allegra 3.0 T MRI scanner.
A 2D spin-echo scout (TR = 4000 ms, TE = 40 ms, matrix size 256 × 246, 4-mm thick, 1-
mm gap) was acquired in the sagittal plane to allow prescription of the slices to be obtained
in the remaining scans. For each participant, a high-resolution structural T2-weighted echo-
planar imaging volume (spin-echo, TR = 5000 ms, TE = 33 ms, matrix size 128 × 128, FOV
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= 20 cm, 36 slices, 1.56-mm in-plane resolution, 3-mm thick) was acquired coplanar with
the functional scan, for registration during pre-processing. Task stimuli were presented on a
computer screen through MR-compatible goggles. Both the angry facial expressions and
fixation baseline conditions were presented during a functional scan (parameters for
functional scan: gradient-echo, TR = 3000 ms, TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 90, matrix size 64 ×
64, FOV = 200 mm, 36 slices, 3.0 mm slice thickness).
fMRI—Using Automated Image Registration (Woods et al., 1998a, 1998b) implemented in
the LONI Pipeline Processing Environment (http://www.pipeline.loni.ucla.edu; Rex et al.,
2003) all functional images were realigned to correct for head motion, co-registered to their
respective high-resolution structural images using a 6-parameter rigid body transformation
model, spatially normalized into a Talairach-compatible MR atlas (Woods et al., 1999) using
polynomial nonlinear warping, and smoothed using a 6-mm Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were implemented in SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK). First-level effects were estimated using the general linear model
and employed a canonical hemodynamic response function convolved with the experimental
design. Low-frequency noise was removed using a high-pass filter. The task was modeled at
the first (subject) level as an event-related design, with two conditions (angry, fixation).
Linear contrasts comparing these conditions were computed for each participant. Random
effects analyses of the group were computed using the contrast images generated for each
participant.
We first examined the main effect of viewing angry expressions by comparing neural
activity during the viewing of angry expressions vs. fixation in a whole-brain analysis (p < .
005, 10 voxels). In addition, because the amygdala is known to respond to viewing negative
facial expressions, we conducted ROI analyses of the left and right amygdala. Amygdala
ROIs were structurally defined a priori based on the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas,
and we searched for significantly active clusters within these anatomically defined regions
(for left amygdala: −32<x<−12, −12<y<4, −24<z<−8; for right amygdala: 12<x<32,
−21<y<4, −24<z<−8). All ROIs were normalized into Talairach space, given that functional
data were normalized to a standard Talairach template during pre-processing.
Then, to examine how social status related to neural responses in mentalizing regions during
the processing of threatening facial expressions, parental SES was entered as a regressor in
the contrast of threatening faces >fixation. Based on the results from Study 1, we restricted
our analysis to only search for significantly active clusters within anatomically defined
regions-of-interest (ROIs) based on the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas for regions
that were significantly correlated with social status in Study 1 (DMPFC, MPFC, precuneus/
PCC). We also examined the relation of SES to neural activation in the amygdala, given its
known role in SES and threat processing (Gianaros et al., 2007). As in Study 1, statistical
significance was based on both a peak threshold and a spatial extent threshold that corrects
for multiple comparisons to a level of p < .05. Spatial extent threshold was determined by
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations conducted using the AlphaSim program in AFNI. The
criteria input to AlphaSim included uncorrected p-value (.005), voxel size (2 × 2 × 2) spatial
smoothing kernel (6 mm), and number of voxels in each ROI (2560 in DMPFC, 4091 in
MPFC, 7467 in precuneus/PCC, 716 in bilateral amygdala). Given that this is the first study
to investigate how SES influences mentalizing in a younger population, we calculated a
separate extent-threshold to achieve a corrected p value of .05 for each ROI in order to more
fully probe the neural regions associated with SES in adolescents. Furthermore, because
Study 2 uses a more exploratory task that we wouldn't necessarily expect to yield activation
in mentalizing regions, correcting across a mask of all ROIs may limit our ability to explore
activations that are smaller (i.e., amygdala) or more circumscribed given the task
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(Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009). This approach resulted in a minimum cluster size of 24
voxels in DMPFC, 28 voxels in MPFC, 33 voxels in precuneus/PCC, and 18 voxels in the
amygdala. Although the functional scans were normalized to a Talairach template, for ease
of comparison across studies, all coordinates have been converted to MNI space.
Results and discussion
To examine neural activity while viewing angry faces (regardless of SES), we compared
neural activity during the viewing of the angry facial expressions to neural activity during
fixation. Results showed greater activity in visual and fusiform regions (BA 17/18) during
the processing of faces, compared to fixation baseline (x = −22, y = −84, z = −12, t = 7.42, k
= 3980). Results from ROI analyses of the amygdala revealed a significantly active cluster
in left amygdala (x = −18, y = −8, z = −17, t = 3.01, k = 11) during the processing of angry
faces compared to fixation (p < .05). There were no significantly active clusters within the
right amygdala.
Next, we examined whether SES related to neural activity in the mentalizing network during
the processing of angry facial expressions (relative to fixation). Results revealed a negative
correlation between SES and neural activity in clusters within the DMPFC, as well as the
left amygdala (see Table 2/Fig. 2). There were no significantly active voxels in other regions
of the mentalizing network. Thus, lower SES was associated with greater activity in one
region often engaged during mentalizing (i.e., DMPFC) as well as the amygdala, often
associated with emotion/threat processing. When we expanded our search space to include
all voxels of the brain (not just the mentalizing ROIs), there were no additional neural
regions that showed a negative correlation with SES. Finally, SES did not correlate
positively with neural activity in any regions.2
Consistent with the results from Study 1, Study 2 demonstrated a negative correlation
between an objective indicator of status – SES – and neural activity in a brain region
involved in thinking about the minds of others (i.e., DMPFC). In addition, Study 2, which
used threatening social images, also highlighted a negative relationship between SES and
amygdala activity.
General discussion
The present studies investigated how social status relates to neural activity during tasks that
may be related to the tendency to think about the thoughts and feelings of others. Across two
studies, social status was associated with neural activity in a region of the mentalizing
network (DMPFC), such that individuals who were lower in social status showed greater
activity in this brain region. In Study 1, college students who reported having lower status in
their university showed greater neural activity in mentalizing regions, including DMPFC,
MPFC, and precuneus/PCC, while they viewed images and read descriptions of other
students. In Study 2, adolescents who came from lower SES backgrounds exhibited greater
neural activity in a core node of the mentalizing network (DMPFC), as well as the
amygdala, during the processing of angry facial expressions. Together, these studies provide
converging evidence that social status is related to neural activity in a region of the
mentalizing network, across a variety of age groups, measures of social status, and tasks.
The current results provide the first evidence for a neural mechanism by which being lower
in social status may be related to a greater ability to identify how others are thinking and
feeling. Activity in mentalizing regions has been shown to lead to greater accuracy in
2Once again, there was no effect of gender on neural activity in the contrast of angry faces >fixation, nor did gender moderate the
correlation between SES and neural activity in DMPFC or amygdala (all p's > .3).
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identifying how others are feeling (Zaki et al., 2009). Thus, the fact that lower status
individuals are more likely to engage these brain structures during the encoding of social
information, even when not explicitly instructed to do so, may be one neural mechanism that
leads them to make more accurate judgments about the thoughts and feelings of others
(Kraus et al., 2010).
Why might social status relate to neural activity in the mentalizing network? One possible
answer emerges when we consider the extent to which individuals of differential social
status are dependent upon others to achieve their desired outcomes (Magee and Galinsky,
2008). By virtue of having relatively fewer material and social resources, lower-status
individuals must rely more on other people to meet their needs (Kraus et al., 2009). This
greater level of dependency likely leads lower-status individuals to be particularly motivated
to understand others' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, thus leading to greater neural activity
associated with these types of cognitions.
In addition to finding that social status influences neural activity in a brain region involved
in mentalizing, in Study 2 we also observed a negative relationship between SES and
amygdala activity during the processing of threatening faces. This result is consistent with
prior research showing that lower social status is associated with greater amygdala activity
during the processing of angry faces (Gianaros et al., 2007). We did not find a correlation
between social status and amygdala activity in Study 1, but this is not surprising given that
the task employed involved viewing smiling faces and reading descriptions, which is non-
threatening and focused more on linguistic processing.
Although the ability to understand others' thoughts and feelings is related to a variety of
positive outcomes, including lower levels of aggression (Miller and Eisenberg, 1988), and
decreased stereotyping and in-group favoritism (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000), a few
studies suggest that activity in neural regions associated with thinking about others' thoughts
and feelings may have a more negative side as well. For example, neural activity in DMPFC
during social rejection or social stress is associated with greater cortisol responses to stress
(Dedovic et al., 2009; Eisenberger et al., 2007). Furthermore, activity in DMPFC and
precuneus/PCC is associated with greater blood pressure during stress (Gianaros et al.,
2005). Together, these results suggest that mentalizing may not be a universally positive
phenomenon; rather, thinking about others thoughts and feelings, particularly during
conditions of stress or threat, may have negative consequences as well.
While there was some overlap in the neural regions that were correlated with social status in
both studies (i.e., DMPFC), there were differences between activations observed in the two
studies. Specifically, activity in MPFC and precuneus/PCC was correlated with social status
in Study 1, but these regions did not emerge as correlating with status in Study 2. One
possible reason for this discrepancy is related to the tasks employed. For example, some
research has suggested that MPFC activation during mentalizing is more common when
thinking about similar others (compared to dissimilar others; Mitchell et al., 2006), and the
stimuli used in Study 1 (photos of gender, age, and ethnicity-matched students) may have
been viewed as more similar to subjects than the stimuli presented in Study 2 (photos of an
ethnically-diverse sample of adults, where the subjects were adolescents). Furthermore,
although the precuneus/PCC is considered part of the mentalizing network, a quantitative
review of mentalizing studies suggests that this parietal region is only found in 39% of
mentalizing studies, compared to 91% of studies finding DMPFC (Lieberman, 2010). Thus,
DMPFC may represent the core node of the mentalizing network, with other regions
recruited differentially depending on the exact task demands and subject population.
Additional research is needed to disentangle how individual regions contribute to the overall
mentalizing network.
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The present studies represent an important step in understanding how social status
influences neurocognitive processes related to navigating the social world. However, the
studies are not without limitations. For example, because we employed two different tasks in
the current studies, we cannot examine how social status may influence neural responses to
tasks involving understanding others across different periods of development. Future
research could address this interesting question by examining longitudinally how neural
activity may be modulated by social status. Furthermore, in Study 2 we asked adolescents'
parents to report their level of income and education, which may or may not relate to the
subjects' own perceptions of their family's socioeconomic status. It will be important for
future work to examine if adolescents' subjective perceptions of their family's social status
relates to activity in mentalizing regions, or if objective reports of SES have more utility in a
younger population. Finally, given that we employed a passive task in Study 2, we cannot
rule out the possibility that our results were influenced by some degree of greater attention
in the lower SES adolescents. However, even if the lower SES subjects are paying closer
attention to the threatening facial expressions, this is still consistent with the interpretation
that lower status individuals exert more neurocognitive resources toward others. Future
research should focus on disentangling what specific neural processes are modulated by
social status.
In sum, the current studies suggest that individuals who are lower in social status are more
likely to engage neural circuitry involved in thinking about the minds of others. The
consistency of results across two studies is notable, especially given that we investigated
different measures of social status (subjective vs. objective), different tasks (social
information encoding vs. threat processing), and different samples (adults vs. adolescents).
Understanding the neural mechanisms through which social status influences social
cognition and social behavior may provide crucial insights regarding both how social status
is linked to health and well-being, and ways to improve the psychological and physical well-
being of those who stand at the bottom of the ladder looking up.
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Fig. 1.
Regions that correlated negatively with social status during social information vs. object
information trials in Study 1. Clusters within ROIs in DMPFC, MPFC, and Precuneus/PCC
that were significantly associated with social status are displayed at left. Scatter plot
showing the correlation between activation in each region and social status is displayed at
right.
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Fig. 2.
Regions that correlated negatively with SES during the viewing of angry faces vs. fixation in
Study 2. Panel a (left) depicts the cluster within a DMPFC ROI that was significantly
associated with SES, and a scatter plot showing the correlation between activation in this
DMPFC cluster and SES is depicted at right. Panel b (left) depicts the cluster within the
amygdala ROI that was significantly associated with SES, and a scatter plot showing the
correlation between activation in the amygdala cluster and SES is depicted at right.
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